The ineffectiveness of real devaluation as stabilization policy does not imply that the nominal exchange rate should be held constant in the face of a domestic inflation. tn this circumstance, import duties and export subsidies would have to be escalated to counter the potential erosion of the trade balance. This escalation of trade barriers generates a rising black market premium and offers increasing incentives to smuggling, already a pervasive problem in the African countries. As a consequence, the central bank would find it more and more difficult to hold the nominal exchange rate constant. This leads us to consider a passive exchange rate policy of stabilizing the real exchange rate by moving the nominal rate in line with domestic inflation.
-2-I.
Introduction: Real Devaluation and the Trade Balance
The usual analysis of the effects of real devaluation on trade flows assumes a high degree of substitutability among final goods in corisuinption and among uses of inputs in production. Thus the typical analysis assumes that all goods are final goods with domestic production of import-competing goods and domestic consumption of exportables. A real devaluation, by reducing the relative price of domestic output, encourages substitution from imports to home goods in consumption, and from production for the home market to production for export. This high degree of substitutability is usually reflected in an assumption that import demand and export supply both have high elasticities with respect to the real exchange rate. The result is a presumption that real devaluation will improve the trade balance.
The structure of trade in same developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, suggests a different analysis and result, however. This was previously argued by Branson (1985) in the case of Kenya, and is also applicable in Sudan. These countries have as a high proportion of their imports intermediate inputs (such as oil) and capital equipment.
In Sudan, this proportion is approximately 80%. These are inputs into a production structure that is to some degree rigidified by the existing capital stock, reducing the short-run price elasticity of demand for imports. These countries' exports are dominated by agricultural output whose supply is inelastic in the shortrun. In both Kenya and Sudan, 90% of exports are agricultural goods.
With inelastic import demand and export supply, a real devaluation will tend to expand export revenues and import receipts proportionately to their initial values in home currency, while leaving them unchanged in -3-foreign exchange. If the trade balance is initially in deficit, the real devaluation may increase the deficit in home currency, deflating domestic demand, with little gain in foreign exchange. This makes real devaluation potentially counterproductive as part of a stabilization program.
This ineffectiveness of real devaluation as stabilization policy does not imply that the nominal exchange rate should be held constant in the face of a domestic inflation, however. In this circumstance, import duties and export subsidies would have to be escalated to counter the potential erosion of the trade balance. This escalation of trade barriers generates a rising black market premium and offers increasing incentives to smuggling, already a pervasive problem in the African countries. As a consequence, the central bank would find it more and more difficult to hold the nominal exchange rate constant. This leads us to consider a passive exchange rate policy of stabilizing the real exchange rate by moving the nominal rate in line with domestic inflation.
If such passive policy is not accompanied by the elimination of trade barriers, however, the black market premium will not disappear.
Unless exchange rate policy and trade policy are consistent with each other, the smuggler's blues will reach the central bank. Indeed, this is not just a theoretical possibility, it is the major lesson from the recent experience of Sudan.
The following section presents a basic model of the trade balance.
In this context, we show the consequences of rigidity in import demand and export supply. We note as a by-product that wage indexation can introduce a rigidity that replicates the results with inelastic export supply and import demand. barriers, smuggling and the black market premium. We first introduce domestic inflation and trade barriers, to show the necessary escalation of the latter to maintain the trade balance with a fixed nominal exchange rate. We then show the effect of smuggling on legal as well as total trade, and relate the rate of increase in the black market premium to the rate of escalation of trade barriers. With a passive exchange rate policy and a constant level of trade barriers, the black market premium will be constant. We finally introduce capital account considerations, showing they exacerbate the rise in the premium if the unreported trade balance is in surplus, and conversely.
Section V applies the analysis to recent policy in Sudan.
-5-II. Devaluation in the "Rigid" Economy
In this section we layout a simple model of export and import supply and demand that illustrates the problems of the "rigid" economy. The model is essentially the same as the one sketched in Branson (1972) and developed in Branson and Katseli (1982) . The duality with wage indexation can also be easily demonstrated in this framework.
Export supply and demand can be described by the following two log-linear equations, normalized on the home-currency price of exports p for supply and the foreign-exchange price q for demand.
Here X is the quantity of exports, p is the cost of production of home goods, and q is the cost of foreign substitutes for our exports. We can interpret p as the opportunity cost of exports in the home economy; later we will identify the rate of growth of p as the domestic inflation rate. Foreign inflation would be interpreted as growth in q. Stating export supply in terms of the home currency price reflects the assumption that costs of producing exports are given in home currency. Stating demand in terms of the foreign exchange price reflects the assumption that exports compete with foreign goods in demand.
Supply and demand in the export market are brought together by the exchange rate as "translator" between and q: (3) Translator: in = in e + in q.
-6-The exchange rate is stated in terms of units of home currency per unit of foreign exchange: an increase in e is a devaluation of the home currency.
The export supply and demand model of equations (l)-(3) can be used to track movements of export price and quantity as functions of the domestic inflation rate p, the foreign inflation rate q, and changes in nominal exchange rate . Total differentiation of equations (1) - (3) gives the solutions for and X. Here the parameter k d lCd ÷ s) > 0. The movement in the homecurrency price of exports is a weighted average of foreign influences (e + q) and home influences p . Alternatively, the relative price of exports in terms of home goods p/p is proportional to the real exchange rate E = eq/p, and the same is true of the quantity of exports. If the economy is "small" in the export market, dxand k -1 also, so that there are no home influences on relative prices and X = sE.
If we impose the "rigid" economy assumption that Sx = 0, export revenue is fixed in foreign exchange. In home currency, export revenue moves proportionately to the change in e, with p and q constant:
The duality result with domestic wage indexation can be obtained by assuming that p = e + q with devaluation. This would be the result if non-traded goods prices were a mark-up over wages, and wages are indexed to the CPI. See Branson (1985) for the derivation. With p = e + q from equations (4) and (5) we obtain again the result in equation (6). This is the duality between wage indexation as commonly practiced in
Western Europe and the rigidity of s = 0, which may be more relevant in Africa.
We can re-interpret the duality result in a scenario of an on-going domestic inflation with p = the rate of growth of domestic money. If the economy is rigid, there is no fall in export quantity. However, the profit squeeze that follows from the fall in p/p indicates that in the long run resources will exit the export-producing sector.
The "passivet' exchange rate policy sets e p = the money growth rate, with q assumed to be zero. This holds the quantity X constant with e = p in equation (5). The home-currency price of exports rises at the same rate as p; from (4) with k = 1,
This holds p/p constant, preventing the profit squeeze in the export sector. The result is that the passive exchange-rate policy with e = p "insulates" the exportable sector from the domestic inflation.
The analysis for imports follows by analogy, except that the relevant rigidity is on the demand side. Import demand and supply are given by
Here p represents competition from import-competing home goods, and q represents foreign costs of production of imports. The small-country assumption sets S = , whereas, in the "rigid" economy, d = 0. The translator between p and q gives us the third equation, (9) Translator: in p in e + in q.
The solutions for changes in import price and quantity m and M are obtained from total differentiation of equations (7) -(9). They are:
(10) ;m = k(e + q) + (i_k);n (11) M = -kd(e + q -p), where k' s/(s+d). The formal analogy to the export solutions is obvious. In the small country, k' -1 as Sm -. In the "rigid" economy, d = 0 and k' = 1 also. Thus the rise in import payments is equal to the devaluation. The same result can be obtained by again imposing p = e in equations (10) and (11).
The duality result can be obtained by again imposing p = e in equations (10) and (11). As in the export case, this result can be reinterpreted to study the effects of a passive exchange-rate policy in the face of domestic inflation. With an infinitely-elastic supply of imports, the rise in domestic costs relative to import prices, n'm' squeezes profits in the import-competing sectors. If the economy is "rigid," there is no increase in the quantity of imports in the short run. But the profit squeeze in the import-competing sector, to the extent it exists, would augur a longer-run rise in imports.
-9-A passive policy that sets e = p releases this pressure.
The home-currency import price p rises at the same rate as from (10) with k = p e = p. This holds p/p constant, eliminating the profit squeeze in the import-competing industries, actual or potential.
Combining the equations for import payments and for export receipts, both in terms of home currency, we see that in the "rigid" economy they increase in proportion to the change in the exchange rate. This means that the increase in import payments exceeds that in export receipts if the trade balance showed a deficit at the time of devaluation. So in the "rigid" economy, real devaluation may be counter-productive. However, the passive policy would hold a balanced trade position in the face of a domestic inflation, with the quantities of exports and imports constant: (12) p + X = ;m + N = = e ; devaluation in the "rigid" economy.
Here, there is no movement in the foreign-exchange trade balance, regardless of the initial condition: the passive policy insulates the trade balance from the domestic inflation. This may be about the best we can expect exchange-rate policy to do in a "rigid" economy.
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Fixed Exchange Rates and Trade Barriers
An alternative to the passive policy of moving the exchange rate with domestic inflation is to hold the nominal exchange rate constant and use escalating trade barriers to offset the effect on trade quantities.
The basic idea is that rising import duties and export subsidies could offset the effects on resource allocation from the increasing divergence between non-traded goods prices and export and import prices.
The model of export supply and demand is modified by introduction of a subsidy on top of the export price received by the seller. We illustrate the case with ad valorem subsidy at rate s that multiplies the export price by a subsidy factor a = 1 + s. Thus the price actually r-ceived by exporters is ap, , and export supply becomes:
Equilibrium in the export market is shown in Figure 1 . The demand curve is equation (2) of section II in non-log, or exponential, form.
The underlying supply curve, the one without a a term, is equation (1).
The subsidy factor a shifts this supply curve down to give the equilibrium intersection at E0. This shows a higher export volume and a combination of a lower price paid by the buyer abroad and higher price inclusive of the subsidy received by the home producer than at the unsubsidized equilibrium E0. The figure shows that if p, the domestic price, is rising due to domestic inflation and if the nominal exchange rate e is constant, the export subsidy a must rise at the same rate to hold the quantity X0 constant.
This result implies an increasing rate of growth of the actual
subsidy rate, since a = s/(1+s), where s is the increase in the subsidy rate. The need for an increasing subsidy rate to provide a constant rate of growth of the subsidy factor can be seen from a simple example. If initially s = 0, imposition of a 10% subsidy will yield an increase of 10% in a. But if the subsidy rate is 50%, so a = 1.5, to increase a by 10%, s will have to increase from 0.50 to 0.65, or 30%.
The equilibrium between export demand and subsidized supply in equation (13), (2) and (3), and in Figure 1 , is expressed in equations (14) and (15) for changes in export quantity and market price net of subsidy:
The subsidy factor a enters both solutions in tandem with the domestic price index p. If an inflation driven by domestic money growth or other domestic factors is driving the domestic price index p, and policy keeps the nominal exchange rate e constant, then a growth rate of the export subsidy factor a that equals the rate of inflation p would be needed to hold the quantity of exports X constant.
Thus in an environment of domestic inflation with rapid monetary growth, a policy of fixing the nominal exchange rate would destabilize the real exchange rate E; in particular, if p grows rapidly, an attempt to fix the nominal rate would yield a real appreciation of the exchange rate and shrinking exports. As we see below, this has been the policy -12-response in Sudan--stabilizing the nominal rate against movements in the real rate.
A regime that attempts to eliminate the effects of stabilizing the nominal rate in the face of a major appreciation of the real rate requires, from equations (14) and (15), a rate of increase of the export subsidy factor equal to the domestic inflation. The subsidy factor a would have to rise at the domestic inflation rate p to hold X = X n 0 in Figure 1 . The subsidy rate itself would have to grow at an increasing rate to provide a = This would, of course, create an ever-increasing incentive to false invoice sales as exports to obtain the subsidy. This is part of the problem we see in developing countries attempting to hold nominal exchange rates in the face of domestic inflation. The policy increases incentives to move transactions to the illegal sector.
The movement in an import tariff needed to hold the quantity of imports constant in the face of a domestic inflation with a fixed nominal exchange rate can be shown by analogy to the export subsidy model. With an import tariff, import demand becomes: (16) in m + in t = ln p -d1ln Nd.
The demand curve gives the total price in home-currency that importers pay, inclusive of the tariff factor t = 1 + t.
In equation (16), p is the home-currency price the sellers of imports receive, t is the ad-valorem tariff rate added by the government and tPm is the price paid by the domestic purchaser.
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The equilibrium in the import market with the import tariff factor t is shown in Figure 2 . The supply curve is equation (8) in section II in exponential, or non-log, form. The non-tariff demand curve without a t term is the demand curve of equation (7). These would yield the nontariff equilibrium E0. The tariff factor t shifts the demand curve inclusive of the tariff down, giving the tariff-inclusive equilibrium at E0. This shows a lower import quantity H0 than without the tariff, with a lower price received by the seller p, and a higher price paid by the domestic buyer tPm• It is clear from Figure 2 that for a given foreign price index q, tariff factor t and exchange rate e, an increase in domestic prices represented by p would shift the demand curves up, increasing import prices and quantities. To prevent the increase in import quantity in the face of a domestic inflation given by p, the tariff factor t would have to increase at the same rate. This would hold M at H as p 0 n increases. So, analogously to the export case, the import tariff factor t would have to grow at the same rate as domestic inflation to hold the quantity of imports constant.
As in the export case, a constant growth rate of the tariff factor t requires an increasing rate of increase in the actual tariff rate, since t = t/(1+t). To achieve a 10% increase in the tariff factor t (to offset a 10% domestic inflation), if initially t 0 (no tariff), a 10% tariff will do. If initially t = 0.50, a 30% increase is needed.
The equilibrium between import supply and demand inclusive of the tariff in equations (16), (8), and (9), and in Figure 2 , is expressed in equations (17) and (18) for changes in import quantity and market price net of the import tariff:
The tariff factor t enters both equations in tandem with domestic inflation p. With a domestic inflation driven by money growth and with a fixed exchange rate, a growth of the tariff factor r equal to the inflation rate would be needed to hold the quantity of imports H constant.
Consider now the quota alternative to the tariff of (a = t = p), the regime with a fixed nominal exchange rate would offer ever-increasing incentives to smuggling, through false invoicing or other means. This, in turn, would generate a rising black market premium, which would make it unsustainable to fix the nominal exchange rate.
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IV. Trade Barriers, Smuggling and the Black Market Premium
Rising import tariffs induce smuggling and therefore provide an extra obstacle to the fixed nominal rate policy. An importer will tend to smuggle if the tariff is so high that it pays to purchase foreign exchange in the black market at a premium it = eb/e greater than one,
given that the good imported may be confiscated by the government.
Denoting the probability of success in smuggling by z, if z t > it, the importer will tend to smuggle more. We assume that the probability of success depends on the ratio of smuggled to legal imports, denoted by m = S/L so that, given trade barriers and the premium, an importer will choose m such that expected profits are maximized. Associated with the optimal m, there will be a probability of success z(m) and a domestic price which can be expressed as a weighted average of the tariff factor and the premium, with r > it a necessary condition for import smuggling to occur. Rising subsidies, on the other hand, reduce the incentive to smuggle exports but if the subsidy is smaller than the black market premium weighted by the probability of success, or 'Y < Z it, it will pay to smuggle more. Profits will be maximized for a smuggling ratio x S/L, associated to a probability of success z(x) and a domestic price of exports which can also be expressed as a weighted average of the subsidy factor and the premium, with a < it a necessary condition for export smuggling to occur. As a consequence, smuggling requires that t > a initially, a condition which is necessarily met when we have an export tax since then a < 1. The nature of the smuggling equilibrium is discussed in , and can be adapted to our purposes.
-16-Domestic prices, net of tariff or subsidy, differ from the domestic currency value of foreign prices at the official exchange rate by the difference between the premium and trade barriers:
;m = e + -where m = nm/Ct + itm).
We now interpret planned smuggled imports as flow demand for black market foreign exchange and successfully smuggled imports as flow supply of black market foreign exchange. This determines the long-run black market premium consistent with balanced legal and illegal trade. As before, we set foreign prices q at unity, then if legal exports equal legal imports (L = Lm) and successfully smuggled exports pay for planned smuggling imports (Z(X)S = S), the smuggling ratios must satisfy the trade balance equilibrium are such that:
z(x) x = m Using (21) to solve for the black market premium and the smuggling ratios in terms of trade barriers, it can be shown that these only depend on the ratio p = t/a, with a coefficient capturing the inverse of the sum of the elasticities of the demand for and supply of black market foreign exchange with respect to trade barriers. An increase in t increases smuggling only if a does not increase in proportion. The premium, however, increases with both, since it is a weighted average of t and a.
It can be expressed as:
where c(a) is the elasticity of demand for (supply of) black market foreign exchange.
Using (22) in (19) and (20), it is seen that an increase in the tariff (subsidy) raises (lowers) the domestic net price of exports and lowers (raises) the domestic net price of imports because of the induced increase (decrease) in smuggling. Note also that in the benchmark case where t = a = it = 1, the coefficients become the share of import smuggling (or of successful export smuggling) in total trade, denoted by
We can then write the condition for the smuggling equilibrium to exist as
The smuggling model summarized above can now be adapted to the model of section III. Under the simplifying assumption that the government does not resell confiscated smuggled goods, exports supplied by home producers (XS) are greater than exports demanded by foreign consumers 0 (X ) and greater than legal exports (L) whereas imports demanded by home consumers (Md) are smaller than imports supplied by foreign producers (MS) but still greater than legal imports CL). Since the differences involve the smuggling ratios for and N5 and those multiplied by the probability of success in smuggling for X5 and Md,they can be expressed as a function of the ratio of trade barriers:
The equality of the wedge between between exports demanded and legal exports on the one hand and between imports supplied and legal imports on the other is a consequence of the long-run equilibrium condition expressed in (21).
Before substituting for quantities in the log differential of the demand and supply equations from sections II and III and solving the model for prices and legal quantities, we note that the solution will be the same as above if p = 0, so that the rule Pu = t = a still keeps total import and export quantities constant. The difference, of course, is that the black market premium is growing at the same rate = independently of the changes in the official exchange rate.
It is convenient to write the solution relative to the no-smuggling model of section III, denoted by a L superscript. We then have: We see that the price of exports is always higher than without smuggling, and, in the case of a small economy, the price of imports also increases with rising tariffs. Quantities legally traded are ambiguous.
In the "rigid" economy, legal trade falls but a rise in the value of imports and exports requires that the foreign exchange elasticities be greater than one:
Independently of legal trade, total trade may rise or fall, except of course for the small, rigid economy. Thus
It is seen that for the small country total trade rises. The only case where this would not obtain is for a country with monopoly power on the import side, say k'O. A country with monopoly power on the export side would still increase its total exports relative to the no-smuggling
situation.
The smuggling model shows therefore that, even in the "rigid" economy, legal trade will only fall if tariffs are rising faster than subsidies. However, the black market premium will be growing at the same rate as trade barriers.
To analyze this phenomenon we need to model the short-run black market premium, which importers and exporters take as given because it makes the stock of black market foreign exchange willingly held, as in Macedo (1982) .
In this connection, the importance of a given short-term premium is that in order for smuggling to exist, it must be such that t > Tt > a.
Alternatively put, the observed premium provides a lower bound for import tariffs and an upper bound for export subsidies.
The analysis is in . For our purposes, it is sufficient to stress that if the reported trade balance is zero, the unreported trade balance in foreign currency is given by:
When the premium is higher than the weighted average of trade barriers, the unreported balance is in surplus and conversely. The effect of capital flight is therefore to exacerbate the rise in the premium.
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V. Lessons from Sudan
Exchange-rate stability is desirable in a developing country because it eliminates a major source of uncertainty as the traded-goods sectors develop. As we saw above, an attempt to stabilize the nominal exchange rate in the face of domestic inflation will require increasing trade restrictions and the rising incentives they provide for illegal activity.
An alternative objective is stabilization of the real exchange rate so as to insulate the traded-goods sectors and the trade balance from domestic inflation. To stabilize the real exchange rate, the nominal rate e should be moved to offset the home inflation differential. For a constant E, the nominal rate e would follow the rule (36) ep-q
Once we have accepted, on principle, that the objective for exchange-rate stabilization is the real exchange rate, we face the question: to which nominal rate do we apply the rule given in equation (36)? The dollar rate? The sterling rate? An average? Do we use import or export weights in forming the average? The general answer to these questions is that the real effective exchange rate can be stabilized by applying the rule of equation (36) to a nominal effective note, where the same set of weights is used in calculating the effective nominal rate e and the effective traded-goods price q. The optimal choice of weights is discussed in some detail in Branson and Katseli (1982) . In the absence of market power in either export or import markets for a small country like Sudan, the appropriate choice is likely to be total trade weights. Thus the nominal effective rate and traded-goods The data on official effective exchange rates for the Sudan are summarized in Appendix Tables 1-3 . The left-hand side of each Table   shows the export, import, and total trade weights for the Sudan's fifteen largest trading partners, with data drawn from the IMF's International Financial Statistics. Appendix Table 1 gives the weighted relative price index p/q (1980 = 100) for the Sudan using export, import, and total trade weights, and a three-country approximation weighting Saudi Arabia by .5 and the U.S. and U.K. by .25 each. Appendix Table 2 gives the same calculation for the nominal effective rate e, and Appendix Table 3 (and Figure 3) shows the real effective rate E. In both tables, an increase in the exchange rate index is an appreciation.
After two decades of relative price stability, the relative price index in Appendix Table 1 While the causes of the accelerated inflation of the seventies are controversial, it is worth recalling that, after the first oil crisis, the Sudanese authorities embarked on a development program designed to make their country the "bread basket" of the Gulf states. The eagerness of these states to provide development aid to the Sudan as well as the significant migration of Sudanese workers toward the Gulf would seem to have relaxed the foreign exchange constraint. Nevertheless, when Sudan negotiated with the fliP in 1978, it was already in a very difficult financial situation. Nashashibi (1980) illustrates the decline in the competitiveness of major crops in the mid-seventies. Hussain and Thirwall (1984) find the same tendency after the 1978 devaluation. It is as yet unclear whether the deterioriation of Sudan's solvency in seven years of agreements with the IMF is mostly attributable to errors in policy and/or policy advice. An alternative hypothesis, put forth by Brown ( , 1985 , argues that both the United States and the Arab countries managed to use the IMF's "seal of approval" to continue lending to a friendly government. The ability of Sudan to continue dealing with the lilY despite arrears on its debt to the Fund is, of course, consistent with Brown's hypothesis but is not sufficient to establish it. In any event, the situation did deteriorate until negotiations with the HIP (1980, p. 50) . In September, according to Awad (1985) , the official rate became 60 piastres per dollar, the special rate 80 piastres while the free market rate was at 125 piastres, a premium of 2.08, much higher than the average of 1.76 reported in Table 1 .
The unification of the exchange system is dated in BS (1981) in
November 1981, at a rate of 90 piastres per dollar. According to Awad (1985) , the premium was then 1.5, whereas a USAID document reports no premium (i.e. 1.0).
But the unification only lasted a few months. In March 1982, the commercial rate rose to 135 piastres, only slightly below the free market rate of 145. In November, the official rate was set at 130 piastres and -25- the commercial rate at 175, again very close to the free market rate.
While the official rate remained at that level until February 1985 (when it became 250 piastres) the commercial rate was raised to 180 piastres in March of 1983 , BS (1983 and to 210 piastres in October 1984.
Before that, however, the official rate was only applicable to the imports of petroleum and some pharmaceuticals because agricultural exports were valued at a combined rate of 142 piastres (obtained by weighing the official rate with 3/4 and the commercial rate with U.
Indeed, by then, the commercial rate itself was only applicable to specific "priority" imports.
While during the IMP-period there continued to be continuous changes in exchange rate policy, the major difference with the previous period is the decline in the premium and the real devaluation against the dollar. This started in 1979 for the free market exchange rate and continued until 1984. For the official rate, it is limited to the period 1981-1983. But, as before, the shift of transactions to the commercial rate makes the true pattern look less volatile than the numbers reported in Table 1 above.
The "strong dollar" also causes problems of interpretation, but both the 15 partner real effective exchange rate (using total trade weights) and the simplified three partner rate mirror the evolution of the official real dollar rate. There is of course a difference in magnitude.
To a real depreciation of 66% against the dollar in 1982-83, corresponds a 40% depreciation against major trading partners. The real appreciation of 1984 is also much larger relative to trading partners (15:23%, 3:20%) than relative to the dollar (-13%). The free rate, on the other hand, depreciated by 10% in real terms, underscoring the substantial increase in the average premium over the years, to almost 1.9.
The decline in the premium during the period of IMF devaluations was consistent with a smoother functioning of the free market than the authorities were willing to acknowledge.
Almost by definition, there is little information on quantities transacted in the free, or "black", markets for foreign exchange. The percentages reported in Appendix Table 4 are shares of total transactions, based on data reported by private dealers to the central bank and consolidated in Macedo (1986) . The shares are considerable both on the export and on the import side, especially if the premium is taken into account by converting values into domestic currency. The data is subject to caveats, since the authorizations to private dealers were revoked from February 10, 1983 through end of January, 1984, at which time the commercial banks virtually ceased to deal in foreign exchange since they would not use the free market rate.
Comparing various sources and methods, Appendix Table 5 study of Sudanese workers abroad, discussed by Harris (1986), however, the smuggling ratio for remittances is as high as 7.27, so that as a share of output they would represent 37% rather than 5%. Even if such figure is grossly exaggerated, it seems clear that the stock of foreign exchange held by Sudanese determines the premium in the short run, as postulated in our analysis.
Appendix Table 7 shows that the intended use of these remittances generally requires imports (the exception may be housing). As a consequence, only a small part of the stock of foreign assets held by Sudanese residents is directed to supply foreign exchange to the Khartoum black market. This may account for the low level of net inflows or outflows reported in Appendix Table 4 . Harris (1986) also claims that the stock -which he estimates at $2 billion -is held outside Sudan but does not draw the implications for the price of foreign exchange.
Despite the caveats about the quality of the data, this evidence strongly suggests that smuggling and the free market for foreign exchange cannot be ignored in the design of official exchange rate policy in Sudan: the smuggler's blues made its way to the central bank! The black market has offset the effects of official exchange rate policy leading to movements in the premium that were determined by stock demand for foreign assets as well as smuggling activity.
In sum, the failure to match movement in the nominal exchange rate to relative inflation sharply destabilized the real effective rate after 1980. The attempts at stabilizing the nominal exchange rate destabilized the real rate, discouraging investment in the traded-goods sectors and providing inventives for illegal activity. The objective for exchange rate policy in the Sudan may well be stability, but stability of the real exchange rate and the black premium premium, not the nominal official rate against the dollar. 
